Frequently Asked Questions

... or ones we think people might ask.

Why TLS?

You may have noticed that Kanidm requires you to configure TLS in your container or server install.

We are a secure-by-design rather than secure-by-configuration system, so TLS for all connections is considered mandatory and a default rather than an optional feature you add later.

Can Kanidm work without TLS?

No, it can not. TLS is required due to our use of secure-cookies. secure-cookies is a flag set in cookies that asks a client to transmit them back to the origin site if and only if the client sees HTTPS is present in the URL.

Kanidm's authentication system is a stepped challenge response design, where you initially request an "intent" to authenticate. Once you establish this intent, the server sets up a session-id into a secure cookie, and informs the client of what authentication methods can proceed.

If you do NOT have a HTTPS URL, the cookie with the session-id is not transmitted. The server detects this as an invalid-state request in the authentication design, and immediately breaks the connection, because it appears insecure. This prevents credential disclosure since the authentication session was not able to be established due to the lost session-id cookie.

Simply put, we are trying to use settings like secure_cookies to add constraints to the server so that you must perform and adhere to best practices - such as having TLS present on your communication channels.

This is also why we do not allow the server to start without a TLS certificate being configured.

Why disallow HTTP (without TLS) between my load balancer and Kanidm?

Because Kanidm is one of the keys to a secure network, and insecure connections to them are not best practice. This can allow account hijacking, privilege escalation, credential disclosures, personal information leaks and more. The entire path between a client and the server must be protected at all times.


RFC6819 - OAuth2 Threat Model and Security Considerations is a comprehensive and valuable resource discussing the security of OAuth2 and influences OpenID Connect as well. In general Kanidm follows and implements many of the recommendations in this document, as well as choosing not to implement certain known insecure OAuth2 features.

Why is disabling PKCE considered insecure?

RFC7636 - Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients exists to prevent authorisation code interception attacks. This is where an attacker can retrieve the authorisation code and then perform the code exchange without the user being aware. A successful code exchange issues the attacker with an access_token and optionally a refresh_token. The RFC has an excellent explanation of the attack. Additionally, this threat is discussed in RFC6819 Section 4.4.1.

As Kanidm aims for "secure by default" design, even with confidential clients, we deem it important to raise the bar for attackers. For example an attacker may have access to the client_id and client_secret of a confidential client as it was mishandled by a system administrator. While they may not have direct access to the client/application systems, they could still use this client_id+secret to then carry out the authorisation code interception attack listed.

For confidential clients (refered to as a basic client in Kanidm due to the use of HTTP Basic for client_id+secret presentation) PKCE may optionally be disabled. This can allow authorisation code attacks to be carried out - however if TLS is used and the client_secret never leaks, then these attacks will not be possible. Since there are many public references to system administrators mishandling secrets such as these so we should not rely on this as our sole defence.

For public clients (which have no client_id authentication) we strictly enforce PKCE since disclosure of the authorisation code to an attacker will allow them to perform the code exchange.

OpenID connect internally has a nonce parameter in its operations. Commonly it is argued that this value removes the need for OpenID connect clients to implement PKCE. It does not. This parameter is not equivalent or a replacement for PKCE. While the nonce can assist with certain attack mitigations, authorisation code interception is not prevented by the presence or validation of the nonce value.

We would strongly encourage OAuth2 client implementations to implement and support PKCE, as it provides defense in depth to known and exploited authorisation code interception attacks.

Why is RSA considered legacy

While RSA is cryptographically sound, to achieve the same level as security as ECDSA it requires signatures and keys that are significantly larger. This has costs for network transmission and CPU time to verify these signatures. At this time (2024) to achieve the same level of security as a 256 bit ECDSA, RSA requires a 3072 bit key. Similarly a 384 bit ECDSA key requires a 8192 bit RSA for equivalent cryptographic strength, and a 521 bit ECDSA key would likely require a 16884 bit RSA key (or greater).

This means that going forward more applications will require ECDSA over RSA due to its increased strength for significantly faster and smaller key sizes.

Where this has more serious costs is our future desire to add support for Hardware Security Modules. Since RSA keys are much larger on these devices it may significantly impact performance of the HSM and may also limit the amount of keys we can store on the device. In the case of some HSM models, they do not even support RSA keys up to 8192 bits (but they do support ECDSA 384 and 521). An example of this is TPMs, which only support up to 4096 bit RSA keys at this time.

As a result, we want to guide people toward smaller, faster and more secure cryptographic standards like ECDSA. We want to encourage application developers to implement ECDSA in their OAuth2 applications as it is likely that limitations of RSA will be hit in the future.

Generally, it's also positive to encourage applications to review and update their cryptographic implementations over time too. Cryptography and security is not stangnant, it requires continual review, assessment and improvement.

Can I change the database backend from SQLite to - name of favourite database here -

No, it is not possible swap out the SQLite database for any other type of SQL server.


This question is normally asked because people want to setup multiple Kanidm servers connected to a single database.

Kanidm does not use SQL as a database. Kanidm uses SQL as a durable key-value store and Kanidm implements it's own database, caching, querying, optimisation and indexing on top of that key-value store.

As a result, because Kanidm specifically implements it's own cache layer above the key-value store (sqlite in this example) then if you were to connect two Kanidm instances to the same key-value store, as each server has it's own cache layer and they are not in contact, it is possible for writes on one server to never be observed by the second, and if the second were to then write over those entries it will cause loss of the changes from the first server.

Kanidm now implements it's own eventually consistent distributed replication which also removes the need for external databases to be considered.

Why aren't snaps launching with home_alias set?

Snaps rely on AppArmor and AppArmor doesn't follow symlinks. When home_alias is any value other than none a symlink will be created and pointing to home_attr. It is recommended to use alternative software packages to snaps.

All users in Kanidm can change their name (and their spn) at any time. If you change home_attr from uuid you must have a plan on how to manage these directory renames in your system.

Why so many crabs?

It's a rust thing.

Will you implement -insert protocol here-

Probably, on an infinite time-scale! As long as it's not STARTTLS. Please log an issue and start the discussion!

Why do the crabs have knives?

Don't ask. They just do.

Why won't you take this FAQ thing seriously?

Look, people just haven't asked many questions yet.